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Abstract 
We estimate the impact of a large anti-poverty program – the Uruguayan PANES – on political support for the 
government that implemented it. The program mainly consisted of a monthly cash transfer for a period of 
roughly two and half years. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pre-treatment score, we 
find that beneficiary households are 21 to 28 percentage points more likely to favor the current government 
(relative to the previous government). Impacts on political support are larger among poorer households and for 
those near the center of the political spectrum, consistent with the probabilistic voting model in political 
economy. Effects persist after the cash transfer program ends. We estimate that the annual cost of increasing 
government political support by 1 percentage point is roughly 0.9% of annual government social expenditures. 
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Introduction 
 
Are voters willing to trade-off some of their ideological attachments in exchange for higher 
consumption? This is a frequent assumption in leading models of individual voting behavior: 
the extent to which voters are willing to trade-off consumption for political ideology 
determines politicians’ ability to use transfer programs to capture votes. In the classic 
probabilistic voting model (Lindbek and Weibull, 1987, Dixit and Londregan, 1996, 1998, 
Persson and Tabellini, 2002), competing parties target transfers to marginal - or “swing” – 
voters, i.e., those closest to the centre of the political spectrum, since a one dollar transfer to 
this group leads to a greater increase in political support than a transfer to groups with more 
extreme ideological attachments. Given the declining marginal utility of consumption, the 
model also predicts that a transfer of a given size is also more effective at swaying the 
political allegiance of poorer voters. These findings may break down for theoretical reasons 
including intertemporal commitment problems (Verdier and Snyder, 2002), “political 
machine” dynamics whereby transfers are more effectively targeted to parties’ core 
supporters, or risk averse political parties (Cox and McCubbins, 1984). 
Despite the central role that voters’ response to government transfers plays in political 
economy theory, empirical evidence on the impact of transfers on individual voting behavior 
is remarkably scant and rarely based on credible research designs. Identifying the effect of 
redistributive politics on individual political preferences is challenging for several reasons. 
Most fundamentally, political parties’ tactical considerations, like those described above, 
imply that funds are not randomly allocated across voters. For instance, political patronage 
strategies could lead parties’ core supporters to be favored by redistribution, i.e., reverse 
causality, leading simple OLS regressions of individual political preferences on transfers 
received to yield upwardly biased estimates of transfer impacts. Yet the opposite bias could 
arise if incumbents, sensing a re-election threat, increased transfers to voters further away 
from the party’s base. Even in the absence of tactical spending by parties and politicians, 
omitted variables (e.g. household socioeconomic status) might affect both the receipt of 
transfers and political preferences, leading to a spurious correlation between the two. 
This paper estimates the causal effect of government transfers on political support for 
the incumbent party using data from Uruguay. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
tackle this question using individual level data and a credible source of econometric 
identification. In October 2004, against the backdrop of an economic crisis, a center-left 
coalition took power in Uruguay for the first time and swiftly introduced a large anti-poverty 
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program, called PANES. The main component of PANES was a conditional cash transfer, 
similar to those recently implemented elsewhere in Latin America (including the well-known 
Mexican Progresa/Oportunidades program). Household eligibility for the program was 
determined by a predicted income score based on a large number of pre-treatment covariates. 
Only households with a score below a predetermined threshold were eligible for the program. 
Indeed the data show almost perfect enforcement of the assignment rule and we can 
confidently rule out manipulation of program assignment on the part of the government. 
Eighteen months following the start of the program, households with income scores in 
the neighborhood of the threshold were surveyed and asked a series of questions including 
their support for the current government. Because assignment to the program near the 
threshold was nearly “as good as random”, we are able to circumvent the problems of reverse 
causality, endogenous political selection, and omitted variables highlighted above to reliably 
estimate the impact of government transfers on political preferences, and thus shed light on 
the trade-off between household consumption and political ideology. 
In our main empirical finding, the regression discontinuity analysis indicates that 
PANES beneficiaries were 21 to 28 percentage points more likely than non-beneficiaries to 
favor the current government (relative to the previous one). The result is largely unchanged 
across a variety of specifications and with the inclusion of a wide set of household controls. 
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that securing one extra supporter costs the 
government on the order of US$2,000 per year, or one third of national GDP per capita 
(though this estimate is an upper bound cost if political impacts persist after the program has 
ended). This implies that a government seeking to increase its vote share by 1 percentage 
point would need to increase spending by around 0.9% of total annual government social 
expenditures. Uruguay has highly developed democratic political institutions for a middle-
income country, suggesting that some of the political findings could also be relevant for 
wealthier countries. 
The findings also provide some of the most definitive empirical evidence to date in 
support of the leading political economy theories described above, especially in illuminating 
the trade-off between consumption and political ideology. In particular, as predicted by the 
probabilistic voting model, we find that the effect of government transfers on political 
support is significantly larger among poorer households, and among those near the center of 
the political spectrum, than among other households.  
In the most closely related work, Levitt and Snyder (1997) study the effect of 
spending at the district level on voting behavior in the elections for the U.S. House of 
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Representatives. To circumvent the potentially spurious correlation between spending and 
voting, they instrument spending in each district with spending in neighboring districts within 
the same state. They find a positive effect of non-transfer federal spending on the 
incumbent’s vote share, but surprisingly no effect of transfer spending. A possible concern 
with their instrumental variable strategy is a violation of the exclusion restriction, for 
instance, if spending on roads or military bases in nearby districts directly affect voters’ 
choices. 
Sole-Olle and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) use the same approach as Levitt and Snyder 
(1997) – again using aggregate voting data and spending at higher levels of government as an 
IV for local spending – and estimate positive impacts of government spending on support for 
the incumbent in Spain. Chen (2008a, 2008b) estimates the impact of government transfers 
on voting in the United States, and estimates the cost of an additional vote is on the order of 
US$7,000. Like us he finds that this cost is increasing in household income but argues that 
core supporters are cheaper to buy off, in contrast to our finding. Like Levitt and Snyder 
(1997), Chen uses aggregated voting data, rather than the individual level data we prefer, and 
finds that there is systematic targeting of government assistance as a function of baseline 
voting patterns (with Republican areas favored), complicating the interpretation of his 
econometric results, which rely on the quasi-random path of hurricanes to predict federal 
government transfers. Green (2006a) uses the discontinuity in assignment to Progresa across 
Mexican communities to estimate the effect of the program on voting behavior. She finds a 
slightly larger incumbent vote share in treated communities but this pattern is also present 
before the program, suggesting endogenous political selection of program beneficiaries rather 
than a causal impact there. A related analysis using an observational design and U.S. data is 
Markus (1988).1  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a stylized probabilistic model of 
voting behavior. Section II presents details of the PANES program and the data. Section III 
investigates the effect of the transfer program on political support for the government and 
presents some insights into the channels behind the increase in support. The final section 
concludes.  
 
                                                 
1 A related literature explores the implications of voters’ political ideology on political parties’ transfers choices. 
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find support for the swing voter model using the introduction of discretionary 
funds in Sweden, while others find evidence of core (infra-marginal) voters being disproportionately targeted for 
redistribution (Case 2000 on Albania, Schady 2002 on Peru, and Green 2006b on Mexico). We focus on the 
impact of government transfers on voting choices but there is also evidence of direct vote buying in Latin 
America, including Schaffer (2007) and Stokes (2005).  
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I. THE PROBABILISTIC VOTING MODEL 
 
The standard probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Wiebull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 
1996) is useful for framing the empirical analysis. Consider a governing party (A) that 
chooses a schedule of transfers to distribute among citizens. Both A and the opposition party 
B have a fixed ideological orientation in the medium-run (a common assumption in these 
models), but the transfers they provide to different social groups is a choice variable. For 
simplicity, we assume that the transfer schedule of the opposition party B is fixed, for 
instance, at what it was when they were last in power, and focus on the policy decisions of 
the incumbent party. 
Voters differ both in their pre-transfer income, Y, and their underlying ideological 
affinities, X. Political affinities are normalized so that a voter with affinity X has a preference 
X for the opposition party over the government; thus voters at X=0 are ideologically 
indifferent between the two parties. Voters also care about final consumption C, namely, the 
sum of their pre-transfer income Y and transfer income T, where the latter can be positive 
(subsidies) or negative (taxes). 
There are G groups of individuals who can be targeted by government transfers, 
indexed by g∈{1, 2, …, G}, where group g has Ng members. Groups can be thought of as 
those with certain observable and targetable socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., the 
elderly poor living in the capital city). Individuals within each group are allowed to have 
heterogeneous political affinities X. The cumulative distribution function of political affinities 
for group g is denoted Fg, and the density function is fg. Individuals are indexed by i. 
The consumption utility for individuals in group g when the governing party A is in 
power is denoted Ug(CAg), with a standard concave function, Ug′>0 and Ug"<0 for all g. CAg is 
the sum of pre-transfer income and the transfer chosen for group g. Analogously, individual 
consumption utility with the opposition in power is Ug(CBg). Taking into account both final 
consumption and political affinities, voter i in group g has a political preference2 for the 
governing party iff: 
 Xig ≤ Ug(Yg + TAg) – Ug(Yg + TBg) ≡ Xg*      (1) 
 
                                                 
2 We follow most of the political economy literature in assuming that voters sincerely express their political 
preferences in surveys and at the ballot box. With infinitesimal voters, non-truth telling would also be an 
equilibrium best response but it greatly complicates the analysis. 
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Xg* is the threshold political affinity below which individuals in group g prefer the ruling 
party. The total number of voters in group g who support the government, VAg, thus depends 
on the distribution of underlying political affinities: 
 VAg = Ng Fg(Xg*)         (2) 
 
The total number of government supporters across all social groups is denoted VA = ΣgVAg. 
Now consider the marginal effect of a larger transfer to group g on their political 
support for the party in power (A), which has a direct analogue in our empirical analysis:  
 ∂VAg / ∂TAg = fg(Xg*) Ug′(CAg) Ng       (3) 
 
Model (1) to (3) provides testable implications for voter behavior in response to 
government transfers. The fg term implies that larger transfers translate into more votes when 
there is a greater density of voters near the threshold between voting for the government or 
the opposition. To illustrate, if the transfer level is already set at so high a level that nearly all 
group members already support the government, then a further increase will not yield many 
additional votes. Similarly, if the transfer is very low (or negative, i.e., a large tax) and few 
group members support the government, then a small transfer increase moves few individuals 
close to political indifference. Transfers will thus be most effectively targeted at groups with 
many “swing voters”, those groups currently close to the political center for whom small 
consumption gains can make a big difference in counteracting political affinities. We 
empirically test this implication below by comparing the impact of a government transfer 
across social groups with different predicted political affiliations. 
The marginal utility Ug′ term, combined with the concavity assumption, implies that a 
given transfer has a larger impact for poorer individuals, those at lower levels of pre-transfer 
income. This insight might partially explain why political parties in most countries campaign 
for some redistribution to the poor independent of their ideological orientation. This 
theoretical implication is tested below by examining the interaction between pre-program 
income and transfer receipt. 
Note finally that the Ng term implies that more votes can be gained by boosting 
transfers to larger groups. However, this scale effect drops out once the budget balance 
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condition is considered, since it is also more expensive to increase transfers to all members of 
a larger group.3 
  
 
II. THE PANES PROGRAM IN URUGUAY 
 
Uruguay is a small Latin America country, home to 3.3 million individuals, half of whom live 
in the capital of Montevideo. The country experienced rapid economic growth in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, and was among the first countries in the region to complete 
the demographic transition, implement universal primary education, and establish a generous 
European-style old age pension system. Uruguay is currently among the most developed 
Latin American countries according to the UNDP Human Development Index, with strong 
life expectancy and schooling indicators (Table 1). According to The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, the country’s political system has low levels of corruption, and free and fair elections 
(Table 1).4 
Economic growth stagnated in the second half of the twentieth century, and the 
country went through a severe economic crisis at the start of this decade. Between 2001 and 
2002 per capita income fell 11.4%, the poverty rate increased from 18.8% to 23.6%, 
unemployment reached its highest level in twenty years (at 17%), the exchange rate 
collapsed, and a financial crisis led to bank runs. Currently, PPP-adjusted annual per capita 
income is just below US$10,000. The crisis laid bare the weakness of the existing social 
safety net, which was largely focused on transfers to the elderly population.5 Yet constrained 
in part by a severe fiscal adjustment, the ruling center-right Colorado party government 
                                                 
3 Related models typically use equations (1) to (3) to determine the choice of the optimal transfer schedule in the 
context of a game between the government and the political opposition. Specifically, the ruling party chooses to 
set the transfer schedule to maximize its votes VA subject to budget balance condition, Σg{Ng TAg} = 0. This 
generates an intuitive first order condition, in which the government equates the marginal vote gain from 
increased transfers across all social groups (taking the policy position of the opposition to be fixed, although the 
finding generalizes to the strategic game, see Dixit and Londregan, 1996): fg(Xg*) Ug′(CAg) = λA for all g. We are 
unable to explore how closely government transfer policies approximate this equilibrium condition in our 
application since we only have detailed data on a subset of the population, namely, the surveyed households 
near the PANES program eligibility threshold. This data limitation leads us to restrict our empirical focus to 
these voters’ responsiveness to the transfer.  
4 The Economist ranks Uruguay as one of only two “full democracy” countries in Latin America (the other is 
Costa Rica). Transparency International ranks Uruguay second only to Chile in the region in terms of perceived 
control of corruption. The Uruguayan electoral system is presidential with proportional representation in 
Congress. 
5 In 2002, total expenditure on elderly pensions represented 65% of all government social expenditures, 96% of 
government cash transfers and almost 13% of GDP. This is reflected in marked differences in poverty incidence 
by age: while nearly half of children under age five lived in poverty that year, the rate for those 65 and older was 
only 2% (UNDP, 2008).  
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(which had been in power since 1999 in coalition with the Blanco party) focused on 
expanding existing programs rather than adopting new measures, with the exception of a 
small emergency food plan. 
The left-wing Frente Amplio (FA) coalition took power after October 2004 elections, 
capitalizing on widespread dissatisfaction with the economy and the previous government’s 
management of the crisis. The FA campaigned on a platform that promised extensive 
redistribution to the poor and structural economic reforms. The new FA government created 
the Ministry for Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, MIDES) and swiftly 
moved to design and implement the National Social Emergency Plan (Plan de Atención 
Nacional a la Emergencia Social), or PANES. 
 
II.a PANES objectives and components 
 
The PANES program was designed to be temporary, running from April 2005 to December 
2007, and it had two main aims: first, to provide direct assistance to households who had 
experienced a rapid deterioration in living standards since the onset of the 2001-2002 crisis; 
and second, and in light of rising poverty during the 1980s and 1990s, to strengthen the 
human and social capital of the poor, to enable them to eventually climb out of poverty on 
their own. 
The PANES target population consisted of the poorest households in the country, 
namely the bottom quintile of the income distribution among those falling below the national 
poverty line. In all, 102,353 households eventually became program beneficiaries, 
approximately 8% of all households (and 10% of the population). 
PANES included several distinct components. The largest element was a monthly cash 
transfer (ingreso ciudadano, “citizen income”), whose value was set at US$56 (UY$1,360 at 
the 2005 exchange rate of US$1=UY$24.43), independent of household size. At US$672 per 
year, this is a very large transfer for the target population, amounting to approximately 50% 
of average pre-program household self-reported income. Households with children or 
pregnant women were also entitled to a food card (tarjeta alimentaria), an in-kind transfer 
that operated through an electronic debit card, whose annual value varied between US$156 
and US$396. Seventy percent of PANES beneficiaries also received the food card. Additional 
but smaller components included public works employment opportunities, job training, and 
health care subsidies; more details on PANES are in the appendix. 
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II.b PANES eligibility, enrollment and baseline data 
 
Enrollment of participants occurred in stages. All low income households were publicly 
invited to apply and the government also made a large outreach effort, sending enumerators 
to poor communities with the intent of boosting applications. Eventually, 188,671 applicant 
households were visited by Ministry of Social Development personnel and administered a 
baseline survey, providing information on household characteristics, housing, income, work, 
and schooling. 
To determine assignment to PANES among these applicants, the government used a 
predicted income score that depended only on household socioeconomic characteristics 
collected in the baseline survey, not directly on income itself. This choice was driven by a 
number of factors. First, many households had highly unstable income during the crisis, so 
current income was seen as a bad proxy for permanent income. Second, because the target 
population often worked in the informal sector, it was difficult to verify their reported income 
levels against official social security records, opening up the possibility of misreporting. By 
using a wide array of socioeconomic characteristics in the income score, as opposed to self-
reported income, the government hoped to minimize strategic misreporting. The use of a 
predicted (as opposed to actual) income score also allows us to estimate heterogeneous 
impacts across reported income levels, an advantage of our approach that we elaborate on 
below. 
The income score was devised by researchers at the University of the Republic 
(Universidad de la República), including one of the authors of this paper (Arim et al., 2005), 
and was based on a probit model of the likelihood of being above a critical per capita income 
level, using a highly saturated function of household variables.6 The model was first 
estimated using the 2004 National Household Survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares). The 
resulting coefficient estimates were then used to predict an income score for each applicant 
household using PANES baseline survey data. Only households with predicted income scores 
below a predetermined threshold were assigned to program treatment.7  
                                                 
6 These included: the type of household (head only; head and spouse; head and children; head, spouse and 
children only; with non-relatives, with relatives other than head, spouse or children), an indicator for public 
employees in the household, an indicator for pensioners in the household, average years of education of 
individuals over age 18 and its square, interactions of age indicators (0-5, 6-17, 18-24, 25-39, 40-54, 45-64, 65 
and over) with gender, indicators for household head age, residential overcrowding, whether the household was 
renting, toilet facilities (no toilet, flush toilet, pit latrine, other) and a wealth index based on durables ownership 
(e.g., refrigerator, TV, car, etc.). 
7 The eligibility thresholds were allowed to vary slightly across the country’s five main administrative regions. 
The regional thresholds were set to entitle similar shares of poor households in each area to the program. The 
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This discontinuous rule for program assignment was suggested to Ministry officials 
by researchers at the University of the Republic and the authors of this paper with the explicit 
goal of carrying out the prospective evaluation of PANES. Government officials proved 
receptive to the proposal and remarkably uninvolved in the design and calculation of the 
eligibility score, which was computed by bureaucrats at the Social Security Administration 
(Banco de Previsión Social).8  Similarly, neither the enumerators nor households were ever 
informed about the exact variables that entered into the score, the weights attached to them, 
or the program eligibility threshold, easing concerns about manipulation of the score.9,10 
There was one additional participation condition although in practice it disqualified 
only a handful of applicants. Only those households with monthly per capita income below 
UY$1,300 (excluding old age pension earnings and any child benefits) could be included in 
the program. Hence, the predicted income score was not computed for households with 
income exceeding that threshold. All participating households were informed of this rule 
before applying.11 
The program was fully rolled out within a year of its launch in April 2005. The total 
cost of the program by the end of 2007 was US$247,657,026, i.e., US$2,420 per beneficiary 
household. On an annual basis, the total is 0.41% of GDP and 1.95% of government social 
expenditures. The program was partially financed through a concessionary Inter-American 
Development Bank loan. 
 
II.c. Follow-up survey data 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
regions are: Montevideo, North (Artigas, Salto, Rivera), Center-North (Paysandú, Río Negro, Tacuarembó, 
Durazno, Treinta y Tres, Cerro Largo), Center-South (Soriano, Florida, Flores, Lavalleja, Rocha) and South 
(Colonia, San José, Canelones, Maldonado). 
8 There was one exception: when officials realized that relatively few one person households would receive 
program assistance, they asked for a slight adjustment to the predicted income score formula. 
9 A relatively small number of households (7,946) were included in the program before September 2005, before 
the predicted income score was even constructed. An additional 2,552 homeless households were also included 
in the program irrespective of their score. These households are excluded from the analysis that follows. These 
households were included in the analysis in an earlier version of this paper, and the main political support results 
are unchanged. 
10 The eligibility score components and weights were made public on the MIDES website only after the program 
ended (in January 2009). 
11 Program participation was also technically contingent on school attendance of all children under age 14 years 
and regular health checkups for all children and pregnant women, as in many other Latin American conditional 
cash transfer programs (e.g., Mexico’s PROGRESA). However, we have no record of any households losing 
PANES benefits for failing to meet these criteria. The cash transfers appear to have been unconditional de facto. 
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The PANES follow-up survey was carried out between December 2006 and March 2007, 
roughly eighteen months after the start of the program.12 The questionnaire was designed by 
the authors of this paper, in collaboration with Verónica Amarante in the Economics 
Department at the University of the Republic, Ministry of Social Development staff, and the 
Sociology Department at the University of the Republic. The latter were also in charge of 
data collection. To exploit the discontinuity design, the original survey sample contained data 
on 3,000 households, including both eligible and ineligible applicants, in the neighborhood of 
the program eligibility threshold score. There was a desire to over-represent eligible 
households, leading the sample to be split between eligible and ineligible households in a 2:1 
ratio.13 The initial non-response rate was moderate at 30%, and replacement households with 
approximately the same score as the non-response households were subsequently 
interviewed; we discuss the implications of non-response later in the paper. Overall, our 
sample contains information on 2,089 households. 14 
To limit strategic responses, surveyed households were not informed about the exact 
scope of the follow-up survey. Both the title of the survey and information provided to 
respondents only referred to the university department and neither made specific mention of 
PANES or the Ministry. Questions about the PANES program were asked at the very end of 
the questionnaire. In addition to information on housing, household composition, durables 
possession, work, income and schooling (as in the baseline survey), the follow-up survey 
collected information on health, economic expectations, knowledge of political rights, 
participation in social groups, opinions about the PANES program, and political attitudes, 
including support for the government, our key outcome variable. 
 
II.d Program implementation 
 
Figure 1 reports the proportion of households who benefited from the program at any point 
since its inception, as a function of the baseline predicted income score. The figure is based 
on program administrative records. The score was normalized so that all figures are centered 
on zero, the eligibility threshold, and such that predicted income increases moving to the right 
on the horizontal axis. In this and all subsequent figures (though not in the regression tables) 
                                                 
12 A second follow-up survey with the same households was conducted in early 2008, as we discuss below. 
13 This main sample was supplemented with data on 500 eligible households farther away from the eligibility 
threshold, although we do not use these data in the discontinuity analysis in this paper. 
14 We restrict the sample to households that joined the program after September 2005 (and thus for whom 
inclusion was based on the predicted income score), with baseline social security income below UY$1,300, that 
were not homeless, and with a valid response to the question on support for the current government.  
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the normalized predicted income score is discretized into intervals. Since there are 
approximately twice as many households to the left of the eligibility threshold (i.e., the 
PANES eligible households) as to the right, we present twice as many cells for eligible 
households (40) as for ineligible ones (20), such that each cell contains approximately the 
same number of observations (35 households). These cells thus correspond to equally spaced 
percentiles of the score distribution. A linear polynomial on each side of the discontinuity 
point is also fit to the data. 
The figure demonstrates that program implementation was remarkably clean. Among 
applicants practically all potential beneficiaries - i.e., those with a standardized predicted 
income score below zero - benefited from the program. The opposite holds for ineligible 
households, and the discontinuity in the likelihood of program receipt at the threshold is 98 
percentage points. This implies that enforcement of the rule was nearly as strict as implied by 
the letter of the law.  
Although the program included a variety of components, we do not attempt to 
disentangle what roles these different elements played in shaping outcomes since there was 
potentially non-random selection into some of them. We concentrate on the overall effect of 
program participation at the threshold, which for the vast majority of beneficiary households 
consisted solely of the monthly income transfer and the food card.  
 
 
III. RESULTS 
 
We use the follow-up survey, in conjunction with data from the baseline survey (and the 
Latinobarómetro public opinion surveys in some cases) to explore program effects on 
political support, the main outcome of interest. We first present average treatment effects, and 
then explore heterogeneous treatment effects among groups with different baseline 
characteristics. We also test the validity of our identification assumption, namely that 
assignment around the eligibility threshold was nearly “as good as random”, as envisioned in 
the prospective program evaluation design. A leading concern is manipulation of program 
assignment by either officials or enumerators, due to strategic responses, or a correlation 
between survey non-response and political views. We also highlight the channels through 
which the program affects attitudes by investigating respondents’ post-program income, as 
well as subjective assessments of their own well-being and the country’s current situation. 
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III.a. Political support for the government 
 
We use the following question from the follow-up survey to measure support for the 
incumbent government: “In relation to the previous government, do you believe that the 
current government is  worse (-1), the same (0), better (+1)?”.15 Figure 2 presents answers to 
this question as a function of the normalized predicted income score. The discontinuity at 
zero provides an estimate of the proportion of individuals who support the current 
government relative to the previous one, in the PANES eligible group versus the ineligible. 
The effect can also be thought of as the net gain in votes for the government relative to the 
political opposition.16  
PANES households are significantly more likely to be pro-government: among 
eligible households relative support for the current government is around 81%, compared to 
55% for ineligible households (still a high level of support, as might be expected since the 
left-wing coalition is widely supported among the poor). The estimated discontinuity implies 
that program eligibility is associated with a 25 percentage point increase in support for the 
government over the opposition coalition. This figure provides evidence that households’ 
political views are extremely responsive to the receipt of government transfers. 
To refine the analysis, we present regression results to examine robustness to different 
parametric specifications and to the inclusion of baseline control variables. Let Si be the 
predicted income score assigned to household i (where a higher score denotes higher 
predicted income) and let E denote the eligibility threshold, such that in principle only 
households with scores below E are eligible for treatment. Let Ni=Si-E be the normalized 
income score. Following Card and Lee (2008), we regress the variable of interest (here being 
a PANES beneficiary) for household i, yi, on a constant, an indicator for households below the 
threshold 1(Ni<0), and two parametric polynomials in the normalized score (f(Ni) and g(Ni)), 
on each side of the threshold, such that f(0)=g(0)=0: 
  yi=β0 + β1 1(Ni<0) + f(Ni) + 1(Ni<0) g(Ni) + ui    (4) 
 
                                                 
15 The questionnaire presents responses in the following order “1: the same, 2: worse, 3: better, 9: does not 
know?”. We recode the few “does not know” answers as “the same”, though results are nearly identical if we 
ignore them. 
16 This is 1xPr(Prefer current government) + 0xPr(Indifferent between previous and current government)+ (-1) 
x Pr(Prefer previous government) = Pr(Prefer current government) - Pr(Prefer previous government). 
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The impact of program assignment is captured by β1, i.e., the change in y at the eligibility 
threshold. The two fitted plots in Figures 1 and 2 (and subsequent figures) are obtained by 
letting f(.) and g(.) be linear functions, though in the regressions we also allow for quadratic 
functions. 
The top panel of Table 2 reports first-stage regression discontinuity (RD) estimates of 
equation (4) with an indicator for being a PANES beneficiary household as the dependent 
variable; these and the subsequent regressions include households with valid responses to 
both the self-reported program participation and political orientation survey questions. 
Columns 1 to 3 present specifications with different parameterizations of the functions f(.) 
and g(.): no polynomial, a first order polynomial (as in Figure 1), and a second order 
polynomial. The first stage is strong and estimates vary minimally, between 0.96 and 0.99 
across specifications, including those that also control for a variety of baseline household 
controls (columns 4-6). 
The second panel of Table 2 reports reduced form intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates, 
where the dependent variable is political support for the government. All estimates are of 
similar magnitude and statistically significant, suggesting an increase of 21 to 27 percentage 
points in support for the government among those eligible for PANES. Rescaling the ITT 
estimates by the probability of receiving treatment yields instrumental variable (IV) estimates 
of the local average treatment effect at the threshold, and these are reported in the bottom 
panel of Table 2. Not surprisingly, given the almost exact compliance with program 
assignment, the ITT and IV estimates extremely similar. Being a PANES recipient increases 
support for the government by 21 to 28 percentage points. We strongly reject the hypothesis 
that government transfer income does not affect support for the government. Note that this 
effect is driven mainly by a shift among beneficiaries from indifference between the two 
parties to support for the government (not shown); there is a relatively little opposition 
support even among the ineligible (9 percent). 
With these estimates in hand, we can estimate the cost to an incumbent government of 
boosting political support using a transfer program. The PANES program cost an average of 
US$880 per beneficiary household per year. This figure is an upper bound on transfers 
received since it includes both program administrative costs as well as certain small project 
components that benefited both treated and untreated households (e.g., additional funding for 
teachers in poor communities), but it serves as a useful starting point. Since the average 
number of voting age adults per household in the sample is 1.78, the annual cost per voter is 
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US$880/1.78=US$495. Since PANES treatment increases political support by 0.21 to 0.28 
(Table 2), the annual cost per additional government supporter is 495/0.28 = US$1,768 to 
495/0.21 = US$2,357, assuming that the impact on other adults in the household is similar to 
that among survey respondents. 
 A useful exercise for interpreting the magnitude of this effect is to consider the 
percentage point vote gain accruing to the government as a result of PANES, under the 
assumption that the survey responses translate directly into votes, and that the same treatment 
effect applies among all beneficiaries. Because 102,353 households were eventually admitted 
to the program (with 1.78 voting age adults per household), and using the conservative 
treatment effect estimate of 0.21, this gives a gain of 38,260 votes for the Frente Amplio 
relative to the opposition, implying that perhaps 19,130 voters would shift from supporting 
the opposition to supporting the FA. In the 2004 Uruguayan general the FA received 
1,124,761 votes,17 so this shift would be equivalent to an increase in the votes for the FA 
coalition of 1.7% (=19,130/1,124,761).18 Since the program cost was roughly 1.95% of total 
government social expenditures,19 increasing support for the government by 1 percentage 
point would cost roughly 0.9% of government social expenditures. 
 We estimate the cost of using a government transfer program to secure one 
additional political supporter to be approximately US$1,768 to 2,357 per year, or 32% to 
43% of 2006 GDP per capita. Even though this study and Levitt and Snyder (1997) employ 
quite different econometric methodologies and so are not directly comparable, note that they 
estimate the cost of securing an additional vote in U.S. House of Representatives elections at 
US$14,000, roughly two thirds of 1990 U.S. GDP per capita (in 1990 dollars), so up to twice 
our estimate. 
The sample households may not be representative of the Uruguayan population as a 
whole: they have very low average monthly income (only US$81 at baseline) and are also 
aligned with the political left, as confirmed by the high degree of support for the government 
even among PANES ineligible households. We explore the sensitivity of responsiveness to 
the transfer across income levels and political orientation within our sample below. 
 
                                                 
17 This is 50.04% of all votes cast. Turnout in the 2004 election was typically high for Uruguay, at 90% of all 
adults. (Source: University of the Republic, School of Social Science database 
http://www.fcs.edu.uy/pri/en/electoral.html). 
18 The source of this figure is http://encarta.msn.com/fact_631504889/uruguay_facts_and_figures.html. 
Uruguay’s GDP (in exchange rate terms) in 2006 was US$19.3 billion, or US$5,514 per capita. 
19 Government social expenditures are 21% of per capita GDP, the largest proportion in pensions and social 
security. 
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III.b Validity of the regression discontinuity design 
 
An alternative explanation for the patterns in Figures 1 and 2 is that assignment to PANES 
favored households with higher underlying support for the governing Frente Amplio (FA) 
party. Evidence on manipulation of a program eligibility score in a recent Colombian health 
insurance program (Conover and Camacho, 2007) suggests that this is far from a remote 
possibility. Unfortunately, we lack data on baseline household political orientation, which 
prevents us from directly testing this alternative hypothesis; however, a variety of evidence 
makes it implausible. 
Evidence in Figure 1 that virtually all eligible households received the program while 
nearly all ineligible households did not, suggests that blatant patronage is unlikely to have 
occurred. An alternative possibility is that the variables recorded in the baseline survey, and 
that determined the predicted income score for PANES eligibility, were manipulated by either 
government officials or enumerators, or that households with closer FA ties somehow learned 
the formula and were thus able to respond strategically to the questionnaire in order to gain 
eligibility. Again, this is highly unlikely since the predicted income score formula was 
developed by researchers at the University of the Republic and never publicly disclosed or 
directly shared with Ministry for Social Development officials during the program. An 
additional concern could arise if non-response rates (to either the survey or to the specific 
question about government support) were systematically related to program eligibility.  
As a first check for non-random assignment around the eligibility threshold, we 
estimate equation 4 for multiple pre-treatment covariates as well as survey non-response in 
Table 3 (and present the results graphically in appendix Figure A1). If score manipulation 
systematically occurred, we might find these characteristics varying discontinuously at the 
eligibility threshold, to the extent that they are correlated with households’ political 
orientation. Focusing on our preferred specification with the linear polynomial control 
(column 2), we fail to find evidence of a discontinuity at the threshold for most household 
covariates, including: average household members’ age and education (for individuals over 
18), income, and for the gender, age and years of education of the survey respondent, as well 
as in the survey non-response in the original survey sample. Consistent with this validity 
check, the results in Table 2 are almost unchanged when household controls are included 
(columns 4-6). Similarly, there is no evidence of a difference in voter turnout in the previous 
national election at the eligibility threshold: self-reported turnout in the previous national 
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election was 93% for both eligible and ineligible households, in line with the consistently 
high turnout in Uruguay, where voting is mandatory. 
 As an additional check for manipulation around the eligibility score threshold, we 
non-parametrically present the distribution of the standardized score. If manipulation 
occurred so that some ineligible households were assigned a low predicted income score, one 
would expect excess bunching of households below the threshold (DiNardo and Lee, 2004; 
McCrary, 2008a). Figure 3 reports the proportion of households with different score levels, 
for the population of households (20,463) in the neighborhood of the threshold (-0.02, 0.02), 
computed with the full baseline sample. Following McCrary (2008a) we augment this graph 
with a local linear estimator of the density function on either side of the threshold. There is no 
indication of households just below the eligibility threshold being overrepresented relative to 
those just ineligible.20 Manipulation of the eligibility score does not appear responsible for 
the effects in Table 2. 
 
III.c Heterogeneous effects of government transfers 
 
Having established that the association between PANES program assignment and political 
support for the government is likely to be causal, we next investigate heterogeneous treatment 
effects. We focus on the two key theoretical implications of the standard probabilistic voting 
model described above, namely that (i) the political allegiance of poorer individuals is likely 
to be more responsive to government transfers (due to the declining marginal utility of 
consumption), and that (ii) those with centrist underlying political affinities are more 
responsive to transfers than individuals with more extreme political views. We then briefly 
explore some other possible sources of heterogeneity. 
We first split the household sample into 30 equally sized groups corresponding to 
baseline income, where each group contains roughly 70 household observations. Since 
reported income did not enter directly into the determination of the PANES eligibility score, 
there is considerable variation in program assignment among households at the same income 
level.21 The R2 of the regression of baseline per capita income on the score is only 0.01 in our 
sample, leaving considerable variation at each predicted income score. Since the predicted 
income score was designed to capture permanent income, the residual variation in income at 
                                                 
20 The point estimate of the log difference at the threshold in Figure 3 is just 0.041 (s.e. 0.027). 
21 A further source of variation in program assignment stems from the fact that the eligibility threshold point 
was set somewhat differently across the country’s five regions, so households at a given per capita income level 
could be treated in one region but not another. 
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a given score can be thought of as temporary income shocks (e.g., due to job loss) as well as 
prediction and measurement error. The extensive variation in reported income at each 
predicted income level allows us to estimate heterogeneous impacts across a wide range of 
income levels, a strength of our empirical setting. 
We then run separate IV regressions that control for a linear normalized eligibility 
score control (as in column 2 of Table 2, Panel C) for each of these 30 groups. Figure 4 
reports the results graphically: each point corresponds to the estimated fuzzy RD effect for 
each of the 30 income groups as a function of log baseline income (on the horizontal axis), 
and the relationship is clearly negative and approximately linear. The 30 regression 
coefficients are then regressed on a polynomial in the average baseline log income (by group) 
to yield the solid fitted plot in the figure, where the dotted lines represent 95% confidence 
intervals. Regression is performed on the grouped data via GLS with weights equal to the 
number of observations in each cell. 
The effect of PANES on political support falls with the level of pre-treatment income: 
the estimated coefficient is -0.238 (s.e. 0.138, Table 4) implying that a 10% increase in 
baseline income reduces the gain in government support due to the program by 2.4 
percentage points. While at the lowest of the observed household per capita incomes in our 
sample the estimated coefficient on receiving PANES is nearly 0.5, towards the upper end – 
which corresponds roughly to the national poverty line – it falls close to zero. These estimates 
are likely to be a lower bound on the true income effect, since household income is likely to 
be somewhat mis-measured for a poor population with considerable informal sector and self-
employment, leading to attenuation bias (although it is difficult to quantify the extent of this 
bias in our data). 
We next estimate the effect of treatment across voters with different predicted 
political affinities. Unfortunately, the follow-up survey does not provide direct information 
on respondents’ voting behavior in earlier elections. However, the Uruguay Latinobarómetro 
survey asks the following question: “If elections were held this Sunday, which party would 
you vote for?”. We use Latinobarómetro data from 2001 to 2004 to estimate a probit model 
for the probability of voting for the Frente Amplio (FA) on the following covariates: gender, 
age and age squared (and interactions with gender), years of education and its square, an 
indicator for homeownership, and indicators for geographic departamentos.22 The probability 
                                                 
22 There is evidence that political support expressed in surveys lines up closely with actual votes: the correlation 
coefficient across Uruguayan departamentos between support for the Frente Amplio in the 2004 
Latinobarómetro survey and their actual election vote share was very high, at 0.85. 
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of voting for the FA increases with age, peaking at around age 40 and then declining 
(appendix Table A2), while education is positively associated with being left-leaning, and 
gender differences appear minor. There are large and significant differences across 
departamentos, and predicted support ranges widely, between roughly 20% and 80%. We use 
this model to predict pre-program political orientations for sample households, using the 
same covariates available in the PANES baseline survey. Then using a procedure analogous 
to that used across income groups, we estimate heterogeneous effects of PANES treatment 
across individuals with different predicted pre-program political support for the government. 
Panel B of Figure 4 shows that the effect of PANES varies considerably with respect 
to predicted political affinity. Voters predicted to be less politically aligned are more likely to 
be swayed by the PANES transfer program in terms of their self-expressed political support 
for the government. The effect is small and close to zero for voters with very high propensity 
to vote for the FA, then moving to the right on the horizontal axis it rises for groups with 
similar probabilities of voting for either the FA or the center-right coalition, and then declines 
again for voters who seem strongly aligned with the opposition. In the figure we report a best 
fit quadratic regression plot, together with 95% confidence intervals. The estimated 
coefficients in Table 4 (panel B) imply that the influence of PANES transfers peaks at a 44% 
likelihood of voting for the governing FA party. An inverted-U shaped relationship also holds 
if instead of using voting intentions we use underlying political ideology (“On a scale from 0 
to 10, where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you locate?”, results not shown).  
 A leading question is why conditional cash transfer programs so often designate 
women as the transfer recipient (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005). Although this is generally 
justified with an aim of empowering women and improving child wellbeing, if (as often 
argued) resources given to women are more likely to be spent on children (Adato et al., 
2000), electoral considerations are an alternative explanation. We find that Uruguayan female 
headed households are no more responsive to cash transfers than other households in our 
sample (not shown). If the same gender pattern were to hold in Mexico and other countries 
with large cash transfer programs, this would suggest that electoral considerations alone are 
not driving the decision to target women. We examined heterogeneous treatment effects 
along other dimensions, but while older individuals and those living in Montevideo are 
marginally less responsive to the transfer in some specifications, these effects are generally 
not statistically significant (results not shown). 
We also examined whether there were differential treatment effects using variation in 
the per capita PANES transfer generated by household size. However, due to the fact that the 
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food card transfer increases with the number of children in the household, and larger 
households are also more likely to receive additional benefits from smaller program 
components, there is insufficient variation in per capita transfers to draw firm conclusions 
(results not shown). 
 
III.d Income and labor market impacts and other channels explaining political support 
 
The estimates in the previous sections show a large increase in support for the government 
among households that received the PANES transfer program. The next question is why. The 
theoretical model in section I links voting to utility, or well-being, so we would expect 
PANES program households to claim to be better-off overall. 
 We first report the change in log per capita household income between the baseline 
and follow-up surveys, graphically in Figure 5 and in regressions in Table 5, row 1. Note that 
per capita income grows by a remarkable 56% even for PANES ineligible households, 
presumably due to Uruguay’s rapid macroeconomic recovery after 2004, although mean 
reversion could also be playing a role for some households. Income growth among PANES 
eligible households is even faster, at 78%, and the estimated regression impact at the 
threshold is 25% (s.e. 0.073) in our preferred column 2 specification with the linear 
polynomial controls. This is on the order of what would be expected in the absence of 
offsetting behavioral responses to the transfer.23 
 Consistent with the lack of offsetting behavioral effects, row 2 of Table 5 shows no 
effect of the program on labor supply as measured by hours of work (with zeros for those not 
in work), coefficient estimate 1.811 hours (standard error 1.495). While the income transfer 
alone might have depressed household labor supply due to an income effect, other PANES 
components (e.g., job training and public works employment) likely acted in the opposite 
direction, and these two effects appear to have roughly cancelled, leading to no discernible 
program effect on work hours. Although this limited adult labor supply response is consistent 
with results from Mexico’s similar Progresa program (Parker and Skoufias, 2000), the 
finding is in contrast to recent work by Card et al. (2007), who show excess sensitivity of job 
search behavior to cash-in-hand. We also find some modest and only marginally statistically 
significant positive effects of the program (not reported) on current school enrollment (for 
children aged 7-18) and medical visits in the last three months (for children aged 0-6 and 
                                                 
23 Household income in the follow-up survey among ineligible households was US$142. The implied increase 
due to the transfer is on the order of 33 log points (=log (1 + 56/142)) 
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women of childbearing age, 14-35), perhaps due to the conditions officially attached to 
program receipt, which may have swayed some households. However, there is no evidence of 
impacts on durables ownership, home characteristics or self-reported health (Amarante et al., 
2008). 24  
 In addition to the income transfer, beneficiaries also received in-kind transfers and 
services, not all easy to monetize and all potentially increasing well-being. Just by virtue of 
being included in the program, some beneficiary households might have also experienced an 
improvement in their self-esteem and psychic well-being. To investigate these issues further, 
we consider an alternative, subjective measure of household well-being, using the following 
question from the follow-up survey: “on a scale 1 to 5, where 1 is very bad and 5 very good, 
how would you qualify the current situation of your household?” (which we re-scale from -2 
to +2). Consistent with the model, the data clearly show an improvement in self perceived 
well-being as a result of treatment. The average assessment of the household’s current 
situation among the ineligible is -0.29, implying that respondents regard their current 
situation as being rather bad. However, this assessment is 0.31 points higher among PANES 
eligible respondents, and the difference is very precisely estimated (s.e. 0.087, Table 5, row 
3, column 2). The effect comes in similar proportions from eligible respondents being more 
likely to declare their household situation “good” and less likely to declare their situation 
“bad” or “very bad” relative to ineligible households (not shown). Results are quite robust 
across specifications. 
 These improved objective and subjective measures of well-being still do not 
definitively explain why PANES households express more support for the current 
government, but there are numerous plausible explanations. Treated households might fear 
that the opposition party would deprive them of their PANES benefits if it came to power, and 
thus express greater support for the government. Another leading possibility is that many 
households are overweighting their own personal experiences in evaluating government 
performance and prevailing national economic conditions, an issue that has found widespread 
support in behavioral economics in recent years (see Simonsohn et al 2008 for one example). 
Panel D in Figure 5 and the bottom row of Table 5 report households’ satisfaction with the 
country’s current situation, using the question: “on a scale 1 to 5, where 1 is very bad and 5 
very good, how would you qualify the current situation of the country?” (again rescaled from 
                                                 
24 Although there is no detailed consumption or savings information in the survey, treated households declare 
having spent the transfer primarily on food and clothes (71%), to pay utility bills (10%) and to repay debts or 
loans (10%). 
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-2 to +2). There is limited support for this conjecture: PANES eligible households express a 
somewhat more positive assessment of Uruguay’s current situation than the ineligible but the 
estimate is not statistically significant in our preferred specification, at 0.097 (s.e. 0.086, 
column 2). We present further evidence on channels below in our discussion of the second 
follow-up survey round. 
  
III.e. Greater support among recipients – or bitterness among non-recipients? 
 
A remaining issue is one of interpretation, namely whether the estimated PANES impacts are 
due not only to treated households being more supportive of the government, but whether the 
ineligible are also bitter at their exclusion, in which case the estimates are a combination of 
two distinct effects. Although there is no direct way to measure these effects since we lack 
data on pre-program political orientation, we provide suggestive evidence that the 
embitterment effect is unlikely to be large. 
 We again use the Latinobarómetro opinion data to predict household’s support for 
the current government relative to the previous one. The Latinobarómetro asks: “Do you 
approve or disapprove of the government administration headed by the President: 1 
Approves, 2: Disapproves, 3: Does not know/does not respond”, which we again code up as a 
support gap for the government, as above. We use a multinomial logit on the same covariates 
as those in Table A2 plus a linear time trend to predict the support for the current and the 
opposition government in the 2005 and 2006 Latinobarómetro, and use the predictions of this 
model in 2007 to derive counterfactual support for the current government among households 
in our sample. 
 Figure 6 reports predicted government support as a function of the normalized 
income score, as well as the level of support in the follow-up survey (as in Figure 2). The 
predicted support for the government is remarkably similar to the follow-up survey among 
ineligible households (to the right of the discontinuity), evidence against the embitterment 
hypothesis. 
 
III.f. Persistent impacts: the 2008 post-program survey round  
 
A second follow-up household survey round was collected in February and March 2008, after 
the temporary PANES program had already ended. Attrition is a minor concern, as 92% of 
households from the first follow-up round were successfully re-surveyed. Yet despite the 
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time that had elapsed since the cut-off of PANES transfers in late 2007, the impact of 
receiving PANES on government support remains large and statistically significant, at over 
20 percentage points (figure 7). The PANES cash transfer program we study thus had 
persistent impacts on political support for the government, suggesting that lagged transfers 
also factor meaningfully into voters’ decision-making. These voting effects of lagged 
transfers could greatly reduce the cost per vote gained through a government program if they 
persist through several election cycles, although we cannot accurately assess the degree of 
persistence given our single post-program follow-up survey. 
 The follow-up survey also contains detailed information on respondent views 
towards PANES as well as five other government policy reforms. The discontinuity in support 
for PANES remains large and statistically significant (figure 8, panel A), perhaps as expected. 
However, support among PANES beneficiaries for five other FA government initiatives – 
pension reform (panel B), health care reform (panel C), the plan de equidad (a newer anti-
poverty program that was less generous and more broadly targeted than PANES, covering 
both PANES eligible and ineligible households, panel D), income tax reform (panel E), and 
wage council reform (panel F) – are nearly identical among PANES eligible and ineligible 
households. This suggests a fair degree of political sophistication among these voters, helping 
rule out a particularly naïve form of survey bias, where beneficiaries simply say that all 
government policies are “good”; and highlights that it is in fact the PANES cash transfer 
program that is responsible for growing pro-government sentiment among beneficiaries. 
 
 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Consistent with the standard probabilistic voting model in political economy, we find that 
beneficiaries of a large government anti-poverty program in Uruguay are significantly more 
likely to support the current government than non-beneficiaries. We use individual level data 
on political support and a credible regression discontinuity research design to estimate these 
effects, constituting a methodological advance in this branch of the empirical political 
economy literature. We find large and robust effects on the order of 21 to 28 percentage 
points. We also find pronounced heterogeneity across income groups and those with different 
political orientations, in line with the predictions of the theory. In particular, the same 
nominal cash transfer has a larger impact among the poorest beneficiary households – 
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consistent with the point that the marginal utility of consumption is highest for this group – 
and among those households predicted to be least politically aligned. The finding that those 
near the center of the political spectrum are most responsive to government transfers provides 
strong empirical support for the logic of targeting “swing voters” for redistribution. 
 We estimate that the cost to the government of obtaining an additional vote through 
the cash transfer program was approximately US$1,768 to 2,357 (32% to 43% of annual per 
capita income). Yet there are several reasons to take these “cost per vote” figures with 
caution. First, given the research design, it is impossible to know how different the vote gains 
for the government would have been had the transfer amount been smaller (or larger). A more 
intricate program design that randomly varied transfer amounts across households would be 
needed for credible identification. It remains possible that the simple act of receiving a 
transfer of any amount boosts support. Persistent impacts of the program on pro-government 
views across election cycles would also substantially reduce this cost figure. 
 Second, it is difficult to extrapolate these results to the case where a right-wing party 
would have implemented a similar transfer policy, or if the policy had been implemented in a 
period of economic contraction, rather than the largely favorable macroeconomic 
environment that Uruguay experienced from 2005 to 2007. Finally, we estimate a local 
treatment effect in this paper at the program eligibility threshold, and thus extrapolating 
treatment effects to other populations requires stronger assumptions. We cannot rule out the 
possibility that the government lost some votes among better-off voters who had to pay for 
the policy though higher taxes, offsetting the vote gains we document among the poor; our 
dataset and research design does not allow us to measure any such effects. Another important 
validity issue is how likely these results are to generalize to other settings. While Uruguay is 
a middle income country, it has well-developed democratic institutions and a long tradition of 
strong political parties, suggesting that the findings of this paper are relevant not only for 
Latin America but also possibly for wealthier countries with similarly strong political 
institutions.  
 With these caveats in mind, this paper indicates that government economic policies 
can have large impacts on political and social attitudes (see DiTella et al 2007 for a related 
result from Argentina). The heterogeneous responses to the transfer that we find suggest that 
shrewd vote-maximizing politicians will carefully select which populations will benefit from 
government programs. In fact, in Uruguay the poverty score threshold for the PANES 
program varied slightly across the country’s five regions, with the program being somewhat 
more generous in the interior of the country where baseline support for the Frente Amplio 
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government was lower. While we should be cautious about over-interpreting a result based on 
only five regions, and have no direct evidence that blatant political considerations directly 
entered into the setting of the eligibility thresholds, this pattern is consistent with the 
government choosing to deliberately target more program resources to “swing voters” in the 
interior and away from their “core supporters” in the capital of Montevideo, a reasonable 
political strategy given our findings. 
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Table 1: Human development and democracy in Uruguay and selected countries 
 
 UNDP Human Development Report 2007  The Economist Intelligence Unit democracy index 
 Human 
Development 
Index 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(PPP) 
Life 
expectancy 
Gross 
school 
enrolment 
rate 
 
 Democracy Rank Electoral 
process  
Functioning 
of govt. 
Political 
culture  
Uruguay 0.852 9,962 75.9 88.9  Full  27 10.00 8.21 6.88
           
USA 0.951 41,890 77.9 93.3  Full 17 8.75 7.86 8.75 
Argentina 0.869 14,280 74.8 89.7  Flawed  54 8.75 5.00 5.63 
Brazil 0.800 8,402 71.7 87.5  Flawed  42 9.58 7.86 5.63 
Chile 0.867 12,027 78.3 82.9  Flawed  30 9.58 8.93 6.25 
Colombia 0.791 7,304 72.3 75.1  Flawed  67 9.17 4.36 4.38 
Mexico 0.829 10,751 75.6 75.6  Flawed  53 8.75 6.07 5.00 
Venezuela 0.792 6,632 73.2 75.5  Hybrid 93 7.00 3.64 5.00 
 
Source: UNDP (2007) and The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007). 
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Table 2: Program eligibility, participation, and political support for the government 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: First stage: Ever received PANES (dep. var.) 
Program eligibility 0.991*** 0.976*** 0.964*** 0.991*** 0.977*** 0.964*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.021) (0.003) (0.010) (0.024) 
       
Panel B: Reduced form: Government support (dep. var.) 
Program eligibility 0.256*** 0.223*** 0.249*** 0.231*** 0.209*** 0.269*** 
 (0.026) (0.054) (0.087) (0.028) (0.056) (0.090) 
Panel C: IV: Government support (dep. var.) 
Ever received PANES 0.258*** 0.229*** 0.258*** 0.234*** 0.214*** 0.279*** 
 (0.026) (0.055) (0.089) (0.028) (0.057) (0.093) 
Score controls None Linear Quadratic None Linear Quadratic 
Other controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: The table reports first stage (Panel A), reduced form (Panel B), and IV (Panel C) estimates of the effect 
of PANES on political support. The instrument is an indicator for a household score below the eligibility 
threshold. The endogenous variable is defined as ever having received PANES. Columns 1 to 3 include, in order, 
a polynomial in the standardized score of degree 0, 1 and 2, and these polynomials interacted with the eligibility 
indicator. Columns 4 to 6 additionally control for pretreatment characteristics (average household member age, 
average household education, number of household members, log per-capita income, interview month 
indicators, age, education and gender of the respondent, departamento indicators). Number of observations in 
columns 1 to 3: 2,098; in columns 4 to 6: 1,987. Standard errors clustered by score in brackets. Standard errors 
are almost identical (differing by roughly 1%) when we use the jackknife approach in McCrary (2008b). 
Statistically significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence. 
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Table 3: Program eligibility and pre-treatment characteristics, reduced form estimates 
 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) 
Log per-capita income at baseline  -0.046* 0.002 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.057) (0.093) 
Average years of education at baseline 0.056 -0.046 -0.216 
 (0.101) (0.208) (0.308) 
Household size at baseline  0.303*** -0.296 -0.599* 
 (0.116) (0.244) (0.359) 
Average age at baseline  -3.928*** -0.826 -2.104 
 (1.087) (2.170) (3.173) 
Beneficiary female 0.077*** -0.020 -0.037 
 (0.029) (0.058) (0.090) 
Beneficiary years of education  0.185 0.107 0.279 
 (0.150) (0.306) (0.445) 
Beneficiary age  -2.449*** -0.599 -2.138 
 (0.795) (1.565) (2.363) 
Survey non-response rate -0.011 0.047 0.026 
 (0.018) (0.037) (0.057) 
    
Voted in 2004 elections -0.002 0.021 0.037 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.044) 
    
Score controls None Linear Quadratic 
 
Notes. The table reports results from regressions of various pre-treatment characteristics on the program 
eligibility indicator. See also notes to Table 2. Number of observations is 2,089, except for survey non-response 
rate, where it is (3,085).  
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Table 4: Program participation and political support for the government, heterogeneous 
effects 
 
Panel A: RD estimates by household pre-treatment income  
  
Log pre-treatment household income -0.238*  
 (0.138) 
  
Panel B: RD estimates by predicted respondent political orientation  
Predicted likelihood of voting for the opposition 2001-04 3.366** 
 (1.640) 
  
(Predicted likelihood of voting for the opposition 2001-04) 2 -2.979* 
 (1.560) 
 
Notes. The table reports the estimated effect of program participation on support for the government, as a 
function of by pre-treatment income (panel A) and by predicted level of support for the opposition coalition 
(panel B). Regressions performed by GLS with weights equal to the sample size by cell. Number of 
observations: 30. See text for details. 
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Table 5: Program eligibility and additional outcomes, reduced form estimates 
 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) 
Per capita income growth 0.221*** 0.251*** 0.188 
 (0.036) (0.073) (0.120) 
Household average weekly hours of work  -1.659** 1.811 0.254 
 (0.754) (1.495) (2.337) 
Satisfaction with household situation 0.291*** 0.312*** 0.266** 
 (0.041) (0.087) (0.134) 
Satisfaction with country situation 0.246*** 0.097 0.043 
 (0.041) (0.086) (0.138) 
Score controls None Linear Quadratic 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes. The table reports results from regressions of various outcomes on the program eligibility indicator. 
Regressions include other controls as in columns 4 to 6 of Table 2. See also notes to Table 2. 
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Figure A1. Program eligibility and baseline characteristics 
Panel A: Log per capita income Panel B: Average years of education  Panel C: Household size 
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Notes. Panels A to G report the average value of a number of pre-treatment characteristics as a function of the 
standardized score. Panel H reports survey non-response. 
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. 
Table A2: Probability of voting for the Frente Amplio: marginal effects  
 
 Marginal effect s.e. 
   
Female 0.126 (0.128) 
(Age/10) 0.156*** (0.045) 
(Age/10) x Female -0.104* (0.060) 
(Age/10)2 -0.022*** (0.004) 
(Age/10)2 x Female 0.012** (0.006) 
Years of education 0.046*** (0.012) 
Years of education 2 -0.002*** (0.001) 
Home owner -0.093*** (0.021) 
   
Departamento (state) indicators:   
Artigas  -0.334*** (0.055) 
Cerro Largo  -0.096** (0.041) 
Colonia  -0.230*** (0.051) 
Canelones -0.151*** (0.057) 
Durazno -0.350*** (0.068) 
Florida -0.174*** (0.064) 
Lavalleja  -0.339*** (0.058) 
Maldonado -0.219*** (0.045) 
Paysandú  -0.111** (0.045) 
Rio Negro  -0.428*** (0.044) 
Rivera  -0.236*** (0.060) 
Rocha  -0.261*** (0.068) 
Salto  -0.336*** (0.039) 
San Jose  -0.194*** (0.069) 
Soriano  -0.216*** (0.054) 
Tacuarembó  -0.326*** (0.043) 
Treinta Y Tres  -0.379*** (0.057) 
   
Observations 2,909  
 
Notes. The table reports results from a probit model of voting intentions on a number of covariates. The 
excluded departamento is the capital, Montevideo. Source: Latinobarómetro, 2001-2004. 
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Figure 1: PANES program eligibility and participation 
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Notes. The picture reports the proportion of households ever enrolled in PANES as a function of the standardized score. The fitted plots are linear best fits on 
each side of the eligibility threshold. 
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Figure 2: Program eligibility and political support for the government 
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Notes. The figure reports the average support gap for the current government relative to the previous government as a function of the standardized score. Source: 
PANES follow-up survey. The fitted plots are linear best fits on each side of the eligibility threshold. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the standardized PANES eligibility score 
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
-.02 -.01 0 .01 .02
 
Notes. The graph reports the distribution of the standardized eligibility score for the universe of applicant households in the neighborhood of the discontinuity 
point (following McCrary 2008a). 
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Figure 4: Program participation and political support for the government, heterogeneous effects  
 
Panel A: Treatment effect by baseline household per capita income Panel B: Treatment effect by predicted baseline support for the opposition 
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Notes. The left hand side panel reports fuzzy RD estimates of the effect of treatment on support for 30 bins of the pre-treatment income distribution and the best-
fit linear regression (with associated confidence interval around the discontinuity point). The right hand side panel reports the same regression for 30 bins of the 
predicted baseline Frente Amplio support for the political opposition, with a quadratic fit. See text for details. Source: PANES Follow-up survey and 
Latinobarómetro 2001-04. 
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Figure 5: Program eligibility, household welfare and satisfaction 
Panel A: Growth in household per capita income Panel B: Average weekly hours of work 
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Panel C: Satisfaction with current household situation  Panel D: Satisfaction with current country situation  
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Notes. Panel A reports growth in income between baseline and the follow-up survey. Panels B and C report the respondents’ assessment of - respectively - the 
current household’s and country’s situation. Panel D reports the household’s average total hours of work (for individuals aged 14-75).  See also notes to Figure 1. 
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Figure 6: Proportion expressing preference for current government: 
Actual (triangles / solid line) and predicted based on from Latinobarómetro (diamonds / dashed line) 
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Notes. The figure reports the proportion of households favoring the current government minus those favoring the previous government (triangles / solid line) in 
the first follow-up survey and those predicted to approve of the current government minus those predicted to disapprove using the Latinobarómetro 2005-06 
(diamonds / dashed line) as a function of the standardized PANES eligibility score.  
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Figure 7: Program eligibility and political support for the government, 2008 follow-up survey round 
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Notes. The figure reports the average support gap for the current government relative to the previous government as a function of the standardized score. Source: 
the second PANES follow-up survey (2008). The fitted plots are linear best fits on each side of the eligibility threshold. 
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Figure 8: Support for PANES and other governement reforms: 2008 follow-up survey round 
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Notes. The figure reports the average support (on a scale -2 to 2) for a number of government reforms. Source: the second PANES follow-up survey (2008).  
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Appendix: PANES program components  
The table below presents the probability of ever having received each separate component of the 
PANES program as reported by respondents in the first follow-up survey. The first row reports 
the probability of ever having received the main cash transfer (ingreso ciudadano), the central 
element of the program, consisting of a monthly transfer independent of household size initially 
set at UY$1,360 (approximately US$56) per month, equivalent to half the monthly minimum 
wage, and was later adjusted upward in nominal terms for inflation. Households in the treatment 
group received the monthly income provided they were not involved in public works 
employment (trabajo por Uruguay), which paid a monthly salary of UY$2,720 in lieu of the 
cash transfer. Participation in this employment scheme was voluntary and, among households 
who applied for jobs, participants were selected by lottery. Nearly all eligible households 
declared having received the cash transfer at some point during the program while only a 
minority (17%) benefited from public works employment, as shown in row 3.  
Row 2 reports the proportion of households receiving the food card (tarjeta alimentaria). 
This was the second central element of PANES and covered households with children under age 
18 and pregnant women. This was an in-kind transfer that operated through an electronic debit 
card, whose monthly value varied between UY$300 and UY$800 depending on household 
demographic composition. Purchases could be made in authorized stores. The program covered 
around 67% of eligible households while participation among ineligibles was close to zero. 
Around 15% of eligible households reported having participated in a job training program 
(rutas de salida). These were programs of six months duration implemented by NGOs, 
neighborhood commissions, and political and trade union organizations for groups of up to 25 
participants. While participation for beneficiary households was compulsory in principle, no 
formal criterion was established regarding which member of the household had to participate, or 
the content of the training activities, and row 4 shows clearly that the aim of universal job 
training was far from being achieved. 
For simplicity the remaining components of the PANES program are collected into an 
“other” category in the last row of the table. This category includes: connection to public utilities 
networks (water and electricity) for a nominal fee, in-kind transfers of building materials for 
home improvements, up to approximately US$1,000; health care including free dental and eye 
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care (e.g., cataract surgery performed in Cuba) and prostheses; micro-finance loans and technical 
assistance for small entrepreneurial activities; and temporary accommodation for homeless 
households. Overall, around 21% of beneficiary households reported having received at least one 
of these additional components. Additional government programs that affected both PANES 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary households included additional school teachers in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods (maestros comunitarios) and improved access to the public health sector. 
 
Appendix Table A1: Self-reported PANES take-up among beneficiaries, by component (%) 
Citizen Income 97.6 
Food card 66.9 
Public works employment 17.0 
Job training 15.1 
Other components 21.3 
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